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A.

Provinces and Regions in the Argentine Republic

In 1964, I had the boldness or the courage to publish an essay
titled, The Present Condition of Federalism, and subtitled, "Institutional and Economic Aspects of the Argentine Reality,"' which
included a stimulating prologue by Dr. Alberto A. Spota.
Much water has passed under the bridge since then -- years of
institutional and political vicissitudes. There appeared on the
scene new protagonists, new obstacles, and the newest of problems
and questions which were unimaginable until just a short time
ago. Moreover, the last decade of the Twentieth Century brought
forth ill-advised policies and technical-economic phenomena of
unthinkable magnitude and consequences.
Today we must confront the challenges of globalization, and we
are also called on to deal with the risky undertaking of "integration," both regionally and beyond. But we continue to operate
with structures conceived in the Eighteenth Century, which divided us deeply throughout the Nineteenth Century, and which
put us on a downward path throughout the Twentieth Century.
Argentina has been offered four models or patterns of federalism, within a variety that is broader still:
a)the Artigas 2 model: a strong leader within a confederation;

1. Jorge Reinaldo Vanossi, Situaci6n Actual del Federalismo; Aspectos Institucionales
y Econ6micos: En ParticularSobre la Realidad Argentina, Depalma, (1964).
2. Translator'snote Jose Gervasio Artigas (1764-1850) was born in Montevideo. In
1811 he joined the revolt of Rio de la Plata against Spain. A few years later he broke with
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b)the model of the Constitution of 1853 in its original version:
centripetal, although loved by the provincial chiefs of the time,
and tamed by Urquiza;
c) the model set forth in the Constitution in the definitive form
which it acquired with the amendments of 1860: centrifugal, put
forward by the residents of Buenos Aires, and accepted by the
people of the provinces (notwithstanding the grumblings of Alberdi3 ).
d)
the model of the so-called Reform of 1994, which
would point toward pro-regionalism, though with limitations,
but which is, in reality, a hybrid resulting from numerous contradictions which swing between centralization and decentralization.
What stands out in the dynamic dimension between 1820, the
year of the first great collapse of national power, and the current
sad and mediocre state of affairs at the dawning of the new millennium is the predominance of the centripetal force, which imposes itself with irreversible character.
Rodolfo Rivarola keenly pointed this out at the beginning of the
twentieth century in his powerful work titled Del regimen federativo al unitario (From the FederativeRegime to the Unitary),4 in
which he reviews the factors of unity and federation which Alberdi
had inventoried in chapter 17 of his Bases,5 and comes to the conclusion --beyond the "mixed" character which the great son of Tucuman attributed to our regime --that "while the unitary factors
have been maintained and accentuated enormously, the federative
6
factors have been attenuated, diminished, and made hazy.
Now, a century later, the situation is even more grave. Located
between the cryptic and the Sybilline, between the confused and
the mysterious, between the utopian and the prophetic, between
magic and reason, we debate among ourselves with despair about
the reissuance in paperback of glorious pasts and lost illusions.
Let us not pretend to attribute to ourselves the qualities of Sibyl,
the woman whom the ancients believed to be animated by a prophetic spirit; even less are we possessors of the "Sibylines," that is,
of the books that the Sibyl of Cumae sold to Tarquinius "the
the other provinces and became a leader of the movement for the independence of the
"Banda Oriental," which is now known as Uruguay.
3. Translator'snote. Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810-1884) is considered the father of the
Argentine Constitution.
4. RODOLFo RIVAROLA, DEL RtGIMINE FEDERATIVO AL UNITARIO, (Ed. Peuser) (1908).
5. JuAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI, BASES Y PUNTES DE PARTIDA PARA LA ORGANIZACI6N
POLTICA DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA (1852).

6.

RIVAROLA, supra note 4 at 361-67.
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Proud," and that, it is supposed, contained the predictions of the
fate of Rome.
But, legends aside, it is enough that we reacquaint ourselves
with the testimony concerning the evolution of our vertical, or territorial, division of Constitutional power.
If we wish to confront these matters, it is sufficient to have recourse to the judgment of Vittorio Emmanuelle Orlando 7 soon after his visit to our country in the 1920's:
What type of federal state is the Argentine Republic? It is, we
should say, on the extreme right of federalism, in the sense that,
8
compared with other such States, it nurses unitarianism.
Of all the determining causes of this phenomenon, we can emphasize the following three of those mentioned in our work of
1964:9
a)De facto governments, which repeatedly and for increasingly
long periods, aggravated the unitary process by concentrating and
centralizing power.
b)The national political parties most favored by the voters,
which were characterized by a centralized structure, and, usually,
with personalist leadership.
c) The suctioning-off of the economic and financial resources of
the provinces by the central power.
During the 1960's, the situation was already pathetic:
N FM1ix Luna 10 spoke to us of the delusion created by the deceptive use of federalist rhetoric in political discourse.
0 Into the framework of classifications and typologies, we inserted the paradigms of "quasi-federalism" or, even worse,
"pseudo-federalism."
0 Economic trends, tendencies, and orientacions, for their part,
in their totality, obscured the increasing financial dependency of
the provinces on the decisions of the Central Bank.
In my legislative career, I have proposed that Argentina return
to that sharing of resources that was established in the Historic
Constitution, through the harmonious interplay of article 4 and

7. Translator'snote. Vittorio Emmanuelle Orlando (1860-1952) was an Italian statesman and constitutional lawyer, best known as prime minister of Italy from 1917 to 1919
and leader of his country's delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, 1919.
8. Un tipo de Stato federale, la Constituzione Argentina, Giuffre Milano, Dirretto
Pubblico Generale 337-38 (1954).
9. See, supra, note 1.
10. Translator'snota.Felix Luna (1925-): The most widely-read Argentine historian of
the latter half of the twentieth century.
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article 67, inciso 2.11 On September 18 of that same year I presented another proposed resolution for the purpose of encouraging
programs directed to strengthening the establishment of various
2
regionalization alternatives.'
The Reformed Constitution of 1994 contains various contradictions:
0 A new regime of "coparticipation" (art. 75, inc. 2), which [ten]
years later forms part of the catalogue of illusions.
0 Article 124, which apparently will remain in the repertoire of
inoperative clauses. A confederation?
0 The so-called "development clause" (art. 75, inc. 10) insofar as
it confirms the mandate to the Congress to "... promote differentiated policies which tend to bring into balance the unequal relative development of provinces and regions .... "
0 The new system of presidential election (art. 14), by direct
vote in two rounds, treating the whole country for this purpose as
"a single district."
0 The new system of election of Senators (art. 54): "The Senate
shall be composed of three senators for each province and three for
the Federal Capital, elected directly and together, two seats going
to the party which obtains the greatest number of votes and the
third seat to the party with the next-highest number of votes.
Each senator shall have one vote."
0 The initiative of the Senate: art. 75, inc. 2. "Treaty-law,
which moreover may not be modified unilaterally or regulated and
shall be approved by the Provinces.... ."? A Confederation?
MArt. 75, inc. 19: regional and provincial equilibrium (in combination with art. 124).
II.
In the face of all this, it is appropriate to ask: Are we confronted
with irreversible tendencies? Our first response is that it seems
so. But then, should we or can we joust with windmills? Or are
there other roads? And in that case, what would be the options or

11. Bill presented to the Chamber of Deputies of the Nation, expediente no. 1526-D-91,
July 10, 1991.
12. Expediente no. 2734-D-91. On this subject one is encouraged to read the work of
Hector Serravalle entitled Atribucion de las potestades fiscales a los differentes niveles ge
gobierno (The Allocation of Fiscal Powers to Different Levels of Government: FYscal Federalism and the Distributionof Taxes). Hector Serravalle, Atribucion de las PotestadesFiscales
a los Differentes Niveles de Gobierno, La Ley: Periodico Economico Tributario, July 27,
2000, at 9-10.
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courses of action to follow? We see some hypotheses, which have
support in history and in constitutional norms.
Congress shall promote the economic growth of the Nation
and the populating of its territory; promote differentiated
policies which tend to bring into balance the unequal relative
development of provinces and religions. In these matters, the
3
Senate shall be the Chamber of origin.'
This would seem to reestablish the orientation of Manuel Dorrego 14 in the Congress of 1824-1827. In the thinking of Dorrego,
the sine qua non was the formation of units more or less equivalent to each other.
Let us see what Romeo Carranza, Rodriquez Varela, and Venerudite work
tura say concerning Dorrego in their well-known and
15
Argentina:
of
History
Politicaland Constitutional
This is the man who, elected deputy for the province of Santiago
del Estero, takes on most ardently the defense of federalism.
I have said-he asserts-'that the province which I represent
will agree to association on the condition sine qua non that it shall
not be subjected to another province; I have not said that it will
associate in such a manner that it will not become part of another
province.'
Proceeding on this basis, Dorrego proposes to reconcile the federalist inclination of the provinces with their socioeconomic reality-the creation of a new state on the basis of the existing ones:
'In the judgment of the speaker'-he continues-'persuaded by
practical considerations, the nation can constitute itself on this
order or another like it. . . . For example, the Banda Oriental
could form one State; Entre Rios, Corrientes, and Misiones another, as they did when, commanded by Colonel Ramirez, they
formed one province; another State could be the province of Santa
Fe with Buenos Aires, with its capitol in San Nicolds or Rosario or
at a more central point. The province of C6rdoba has all the qualities, including wealth, necessary to be a single State. La Rioja
and Catamarca together can constitute another State; the prov13. CONST. ARG., Art. 75, inc. 19, 2d. part (emphasis added).
14. Translator'snot-- Manuel Dorrego: A leader of the provincial opposition to the Unitarian Constitution of 1826. Elected Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires in 1927.
Killed in December, 1828 by forces rebelling against his government.
15. 2 ROMEO CARRANzA & RODRIQUEZ VARELA, HISTORIA POLITICA Y CONSTITUCIONAL
DE LA ARGENTINA 57-58 (A-Z ed. 1993).
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inces of Santiago del Estero and Tucumin another; the province of
Salta is in the same situation as Cordoba; the [three] provinces of
Cuyo, another; and thus all difficulties are overcome. For the internal organization of each province what is necessary is practical
knowledge and a desire to improve, and this matter is most appropriately left to those who live in the place than to those who
16
come from outside.
For his part, Orlandi, in Principiosde Ciencia Politica y Teorfa
del Estado,17 asserts:
Dorrego was the first who advanced the thesis of region on the
basis of geographicalproximity. Our regionalism and regionalization is a socio-economic problem, but the solution is a federalpolitical one.' 8
We ask ourselves: How many provinces are self-financing?
Which of them can we say are self-sustaining? The answer: the
minority, perhaps no more than the Federal Capitol, Buenos Aires, C6rdoba, Santa Fe, Mendoza, and Entre Rios.. According to
pathetic data, Alvaro Ruiz Moreno states categorically in "Rethinking the Argentine Federal Fiscal System"19 the following:
The average in the 24 jurisdictions [i.e., the 23 Provinces and
the City of Buenos Aires] of the relationship between debt and
revenue is 55.5%, reaching in some cases more than 100%. The
promised coparticipation exceeds in some cases 60%, reaching in
some instances 97%, and the share of their own tax revenue in
relation to total revenue, except in . . .the City of Buenos Aires
and the Province of Buenos Aires, does not exceed 35%, and in ex0
treme cases is less than 10%.2
Between the power of the Central Bank and that of the National
Treasury there is configured a new coercive form, subtle but effective, of "federal intervention," not foreseen in article 6 of the National Constitution.
On the other side of the coin, provincial legislatures and governors do not overuse, but rather underuse, the autonomy guaranteed them by article 5 of the Constitution, in the following respects:

16.
17.
18.
19.
2000.
20.

Id.
Orlandi, Principos de Ciencia Politica y Teoria del Estado (Plus Ultra ed. 1985).
Id. at 643.
Alvaro Ruiz Moreno, Repensar el Sistema Fiscal FederalArgentino, Clarin, July 31,
Id.
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(a) They do not make strong efforts to collect taxes, perhaps because this may be unpopular.
(b) There results a "double-taxation," when this seems easier
(as in the case of Catamarca).
(c) They spend extravagantly (as in the case of La Rioja).
(d) They engage in rash financial practices which then produce
failures, which in turn cause them to pay large reparations (as in
the case of Tucumin).
(e) When the water "rises to the collar," they come as suppliants to the Federal Capital.
III.
Art. 13 [Showing the great wisdom of the Constitutional delegates!]:
New provinces may be admitted to the Nation, but a new
province may not be created within the territory of one or
more others, nor may several provinces be combined to form a
single one, without the consent of the legislatures of the prov21
inces involved and of the Congress.
Thus, the Dorrego formula could be achieved or approximated.
Does it make sense, really and practically, that the Nation is
composed of 25 jurisdictions? There is a notorious inviability, aggravated by the reduplication twenty-five times of governmental
organs with the same or similar functions and without any additional benefit. That multiplication-does it not appear unnecessary?
The complexity of the present-day state apparatus produces periodic crises that batter and punish the already precarious local
economies of large geographic areas of the country; and with each
emergency that occurs, the assistance is always insufficient or the
constant repetition of the shortages and tensions would seem to
indicate the presence of a historic fatalism that is very difficult to
overcome.
Is it not true that the delegates of 1853-1860, being wise and
farsighted, ingeniously wrote the hypotheses contemplated in article 13 with such finality that some future generations might "take
the bull by the horns" and come up with a solution of major sur-

21.

CONST. ARG. art. 13.
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gery? As Hans Kelsen would say, this constitutional norm offers
us a framework full of possibilities.
Art. 13 "from several provinces to form a single one .... " This
requires only the agreement of the respective (provincial) legislatures and the consent of the national Congress. This is one of the
procedures that can be a viable means of drawing to a close "regionalism" without arriving at a unitary situation. It does not
transform the structure of the State and it permits new groupings
on the basis of territorial contiguity and economic complementarily. It is true that decreasing the number of entities [i.e. provinces] would bring about a weakening of their political powers in
the Senate, where each province is now separately and equally
represented; but this would be compensated for by the salutary
results that would be achieved in other areas.
The price of the pride of not accepting this solution will invariably be misery and underdevelopment, 22 as Maticrozo pointed out
in his significant comparison: "in the Argentine Republic-he
said-whose provinces, almost always afflicted by budget deficit,
ordinarily find themselves in possession of a useless sovereignty, a
sovereignty like that of poor nobles who, lacking money, display
titles and parchments which have nothing to do with the necessities of existence." 23 It is this same pride which runs through our
history, from 1820 until 1826, when the Constitution caused the
provinces to defiantly proclaim their independence and sovereignty. Throughout that period, the country lacked-as Bas
pointed out - "even the economic capacity to govern, as demonstrated by a secret article of the 'Pacto Federal,' according to
which Buenos Aires undertook to subsidize monthly the administrative expenses of the other coastal provinces." 24 It is time, then,
for a public recantation!
In my opinion, along with the application of the aforementioned
article 13, it would be possible to strengthen the municipalities
and the other productive units, in order to arrive at a more rational distribution of revenues and resources.
The Reform of 1994 proclaims the municipalities' "autonomy."

22.

See CARLOS SANCHEX VIAMONTE, DERECHO POLITICO 255 (Bibliografica Argentina

1959); JUVENAL MACHADO DONCEL, REFORMAS CONSTITUCIONALES Y REVOCABILIDAD,

Estudios sobre la Constitcion nacional argentina 169, 264 (Universidad del Litoral 1942)
23. Jos6 Nicolis Matienzo, El gobierno representativo federal en la Repiblica Argentina, 337-38.
24. Bas, Derecho pdiblico provincial at 23
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Each province shall dictate its own Constitution, in conformity
with the provisions of article 5, assuring municipal autonomy and
political, adminregulating its extent and content in institutional,
25
istrative, economic, and financial areas.
The principle of immediacy and the advantage of proximity are
virtues of a municipal regime that puts in harmony the rules of
democracy and the demands of efficiency. The people grant or
withdraw their confidence at the level of the neighborhood, as in
the legendary "polis."
It is good to recall that, already in 1908, Rodolfo Rivarola, in his
dissection of the pathology of our handicapped federalism, asserted accurately:
Because of our federal organization, each citizen is subjected to
three levels of government, each having the power to demand that
he pay taxes for his governance: the national government, the
provincial government, and the municipal government. Is it not
clear that [of the three], the provincial is surplusage? We cannot
be rid of the national because it is that [government] which provides the common external defense and provides harmoniously
security and internal welfare for all, great and small. We cannot
do away with municipal government because it attends to our
most immediate needs. By process of elimination, the one to be
eliminated is the provincial. 26
IV.
Argentine constitutional history also offers us precedents of considerable consistency. Let us consider the wise-though disappointingly, failed-Constitution of 1826, whose financial provisions in particular were very realistic for the times and the circumstances.
No form of government has an absolute goodness: the goodness
of each one is relative to the condition of the society to which it
applies.27
In the erudite works of Ravignani, Historia ConstitucionalArgentina,28 and Asambleas Constituyentes Argentinas,29 the author
points out the condition of Argentine society in 1826:
Population: scarcely 150,000 inhabitants, widely scattered.
25. CONST. ARG. art. 13 (emphasis added).
26. RIVAROLA, supra note 4.at 30
27. Report of the Argentine Committee on Constitutional Matters
28.

3 RAVIGNANI, HISTORIA, CONSTITUCIONAL ARGENTINA 324

29.

3 RAVIGNANI, ASAMBLEAS CONSTITUYENTES ARGENTINAS 160, 223

558

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 43

Poverty there was no source of public income to subsidize the
needs of the community.
Incapability. either destructive democracy or oppressive oligarchy.
In the face of these categorical averments of the majority of the
Constituent Congress, according to Galletti it does not appear certain that there was an active intervention on the part of Dorrego,
as is currently asserted. In order to rescue the truth, let me review some of the provisions of that Constitution:
E Provincial revenues were derived from directtaxes, since indirect taxes were designated for the national treasury. If there was
anything left over after provincial expenses were paid, it was invested in the same Province, in works approved by the National
Legislature (which also approved the accounts).
E "Councils of Administration" were established at the provincial level. These were composed of between seven and fifteen
members, who were chosen by direct popular vote for terms of two
years (with one-half of the members being elected each year), and
who served without compensation. It was the responsibility of
these Councils to prepare the [respective] provincial budgets (subject to the approval of the national legislature), and to impose and
collect direct taxes.
In a word: a limit was placed on waste!!
I insist on demonstrating the reasonableness and sensibleness
of the statesmen of that era. The Constitution which the Constituent Congress of 1824-1827 approved-under the inspiration
of Rivadavia-in the early hours of Christmas, 1826, attempts to
create a "composite" government by synthesizing models of federalist orthodoxy with attempts at centralization. Thus, in the Report of the Commission on Constitutional Affairs--on June 4 of
that same year-it had been recognized that a simple and strict
federation was the form of government least adaptable to the
status and circumstances of the country. And in the Manifesto
which accompanied the Constitution it was said that there had
been selected "all the advantages of federal government, separating out only the troublesome things; and . . . adopting all of the
good features of a unitary government, excluding only that which
could be harmful to public and individual rights." It consecrates,
thus, "the consolidation of our union," as that form of state which
most closely approximates decentralization within a unitary system; and it escapes the accusations based on the liberal notion of
dividing vertically or territorially the power to guarantee rights,
warning:
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The benefits of liberty and happiness, to which we aspire, are
not to be found in federation. History presents us with sad examples of nations which, governed under federal forms, have been
even more enslaved than those under the terrible power of Asiatic

despots.

30

The Rivadavia Constitution [that is, the Constitution of 1826],
in consonance with the ideas defended by Rivadavia himself during the period of the Triumvirate and during the government of
Martin Rodriguez, unites to its progressivism a zeal for a mechanical perfecting of power, by harmonizing the required efficacy
in functioning with the "demarcation" and "balancing" of the organs of government in "just equilibrium." As is indicated in the
Manifesto, "it does not create dangers of confusion or conflict, because if any one [organ] should attempt to encroach upon the prerogatives of another, a constitutional reaction would [ensue that
would] cause the offender to retreat into its own orbit."3 '
The aforementioned qualities are for the most part concentrated
in the eighth section of the 1826 Constitution, which is devoted to
guaranteeing the inherent rights of man as being necessary for
the existence of free government. Thus, the 1826 Constitution
follows the pattern of the French Declaration of 1789 in regarding
those rights, together with the division and harmony of governmental powers, as essential to a constitution, in the proper sense
of that term . . . .While the Constitution of 1853-1860 retained
some of the features of the 1826 Constitution, such as many of the
procedures for the enactment of laws and the operation of the national government, this was not so in other areas, especially with
respect to the provinces, where the later document created a federal State.

Among the differences between the two Constitutions, that of
1826 provided (in article 148) for a clear distribution of tax revenues between the Nation and the provinces, a noteworthy feature
in a unitary Constitution. Another norm of the 1826 Constitution
which is decidedly favorable to provincial development--one which
is not often noted in the commentaries on our constitutional antecedents-is the provision of article 151 that, after the payment of

30.

Manifesto a la Constituci6n de 1826.
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the administrative expenses of a province, the remaining tax
revenues derived from that province, "shall be invested in that
same province," in such public works as the local council shall
33
agree upon.
Thus, we see that in the Rivadavia [i.e., 1826] Constitution
there are two component parts, each of which has run a distinct
course. They are, first, the form of government, "consolidated in
unity," which failed to gain approval; and, second, the perfected
clauses concerning powers and rights, which have been the authentic source of the Constitution of 1853. That combination was,
in turn, an advance over the norms of the immediate antecedentthe Constitution of 1819-; as the Committee on Constitutional
Matters did not fail to acknowledge in its report signed by
Valentin G6mez, Manuel Antonio de Castro, Francisco Castellanos, Santiago Vdsquez, and Eduardo P6rez Bulnes.
In synthesis, it can be said that the unitarian cause has had in
the judgment of history the disfavor received by any defeated
party. Beyond that ... the principles and solutions contemplated
in 1826 need a critical evaluation which rests on bases other than
the parti prid which accompanies all judgments about the rancor
between unitarians and federalists. In making this evaluation,
one cannot ignore the figure of Rivadavia without being guilty of
inexcusable neglect. Rivadavia embodied the last attempt at a
civil, national, and representative government prior to that death
known to us as the confederal anarchy and the Montonero excesses. This proves, once again, the inexorable law of Argentine
history: that the failure of a man and of a party bring about not
only their own downfall, but also the inevitable collapse of the institutions with which they were involved. It is because of this that
every mistaken policy of government, whether of act or--even
worse-of omission, leads to the results that we all know.

We cannot overlook the "circumstance" that we are in the
Twenty-First Century and are distancing ourselves form the Nineteenth; that we are closer to the world of tomorrow than to a past
over which there falls the balance-sheet of history converted into
31.Manifesto a la Constituci6n de 1826
32. Manifesto a la Constituci6n de 1826
33.

CONST. ARG. art. 151.
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judgment. From everything seen, from everything proved and
remains standing
tested, from the great deal that is known, there
34
Argentina.
country,
the
of
entity
the historical
V.
Let us move now to face, with contemporary sensibility, the
theme of the "regions," as dealt with in the new article 124 of the
National Constitution. This norm contains a facultative power:
The provinces shall be able to create regions for economic and
social development and establish organs with powers for achieving
35
their purposes.
Today, the word "region" and the term "regionalization," are on
everyone's tongue. These terms have been used and abused, most
of the time without sufficient precision as to their significance and
reach. Sometimes they are used in gross error, as was the case
with Ongania.
The idea of "regionalization" is not novel and its antecedents are
acknowledged in the report of the majority of the Advisory Committee on Institutional Reform of 1971. That document was
signed by Drs. Bidart Campos, Bidegain, Botana, Oyhanarte, Ramella, Rouzout, and Vanossi. It states:
Only two matters, it seems to us, justify the introduction of
normative reforms. The first is that which may be called 'the region.' The constitutional norms contemplate only two state centers of decision-the Nation and the Provinces-and they exclude
any intermediate authority. In this as in so many other aspects,
Socioeconomic
nevertheless, the reality surpasses the norm.
boundaries, determined by nature, overflow the political boundaries fixed by the discretion of man. Thus, beside the juridical figure of the Province, there comes forth the extrajuridical figure of
the Region, composed of several provinces tied together by a community of life and the accident of destiny. This second figure, the
Region, cannot be ignored. The plural interest which it represents, and which moreover adjusts itself to the modern doctrine of
'poles of development,' deserves to be juridically protected. It is
equivalent to recognizing that the bipartite scheme of the Constitution is insufficient and that the rule that everything that is su34. See Jorge Reinaldo Vanossi, El PoderJudicial en las ideas de Rivadavia y Is Constitucion de 1826, REVISTA DE LA FEDERACION ARGENTINA DE COLEGIOS DE
ABOGADOS, No. 37-38, 11 etseq. (January/April 1975)
35. CONST. ARG. art. 124 (emphasis added).
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praprovincial is national, derived especially from article 67, clause
12, should be modified to create the valuable possibility that the
supranational be regional;that is to say, tha t it belongs to an order
still decentralized, still immediately connected to interests which
remain local, and which look better when we look at them closeup.
The modification which we advise should establish, without
prejudice to the powers of the national State, regional authorities
and organizations, with power of administration and decision, authorized by the Congress and born of the agreement of the interested provinces. These regional authorities and organs would
have capacity for regional planning and the operation of regional
36
development entities.
Antonio M Hernindez maintains in his work Intergraci6n y
3 7 that before the
globalizaci6n
reform [of 1994] Vanossi interpreted the Constitution as permitting different levels of regionalization, according to alternative hypotheses: a) the formation of a
single province out of several; 38 (b) the exercise of concurrent powers of the Nation and the provinces; 39 (c) legislation by Congress
concerning zones of national jurisdiction; 40 (d) interprovincial treaties; 4 1 and (e) the enforcement of the laws of the Nation by the
"natural agents" or by the federal services: its distribution and
regionalization. 42 On analyzing this question, Ricardo Vergara,
now adjunct professor of Public Provincial and Municipal Law of
C6rdoba, wrote:
The options described in points (c) and (e) do not seem appropriate to federalism, since they tend toward centralization ....
Of
all the hypotheses stated, within the federal system of the Argentine State, the formulations in points (b) and (d) seem to provide
adequate framework for regionalization, in that they offer a rich
range of alternatives for the creation of new federal organisms, as
well as for the formation of national and zonal jurisdictions. This
is to say, the constitutional provisions cited (arts. 67, inc. 16, and
art. 107) make possible the insertion of economic regionalism into
36.

Comisi6n Asesora para el Estudio de ]a Reforma Institucional-Dict,4menes y Ante-

cedents, Ministry of the Interior, at 33-34, 47 (May 20, 1971).
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the framework of political federalism, since as Vanossi well points
out, 'the wide range of possibilities which the (cited) constitutional
provisions offer, authorize everything, minus 'political' regionalization; that is to say, the regionalization possible within the present constitutional framework is economic, cultural, and judicial,
provided, however, that it does not assume a political character."
VI.
The seond part of the new article 124 is a dangerous rough edge.
The aforementioned norm, after referring to the power (of the
provinces) to create regions, says that:
they [the provinces] may also celebrate international conventions insofar as those are not incompatible with the foreign
policy of the Nation and do not affect the powers delegated to
the federal government or the public credit of the Nation, with
notice to the national Congress ....44
Loans and investments are other aspects of finance which have
implications for federalism. By virtue of article 67, item 3, it is
the Congress that is charged with "borrowing money on the credit
of the Nation" and, because of article 107, the provinces can attend
to the "introduction and establishment of new industries, the importation of foreign capital and the exploration of their rivers, by
means of laws protective of these ends, and with their own resources." The simultaneous undertaking by the Nation and the
provinces of borrowing activities in other countries has provoked
harsh criticism because of the excesses involved and has motivated
many writers to propose that the provinces be prohibitedfrom contractingforeign loans.
Today the question has international relevance. In effect, the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which we [Argentina]
adhered to by Law 19.86545 expressly warns in article 27 with respect to internal law and the observance of Treaties:
A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty ....46
Thus, without doubt, the Argentine National State must assume
responsibility for the debts incurred by the provinces as local
member-states of the Argentine Federation; in other words, all the
44.
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45.
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Argentine people must bear the cost of the obligations contracted
by the provinces pursuant to the very permissive norm that is the
new article 124.
Antonio Maria Herndndez, in his work Integration and Glogali47
zation: The Roles of the Regions, Provinces and Municipalities,,
remembers well that the debate over provincial celebration over
international agreements began well before the 1994 constitutional reform. On the affirmative side were Frias, Abad Hernando, Castorina de Tarquini, Quiroga Lavi6, and Zarza Messaque, while opposing it were Bidegain, Ramella, Vanossi, and
Vinuesa, the opponents believing that the practice impaired the
power of the federal government to conduct injured foreign relations. 48 So sensitive is the question under consideration that...
Hernndez... observes with respect to this norm:
1) Notice to the nationalcongress.
Article 124 of the Constitution requires that the creation of regions as well as the celebration of international treaties be carried
out 'with notice to the national Congress.' The constitutional assembly of 1994 imposed the same requirement of old article 107
for 'domestic' treaties among provinces. In other words, it ratified
the departure from the United States precedent, which provides
for the 'consent' of Congress (art. I, §10, cl. 3), by requiring only
'notice.'
The objective has been nothing other than to favor even more
the autonomy of the provinces, since requiring congressional consent or approval would have implied a marked dependence on the
Congress. In any case, the requirement of notice makes a telling
point about the connection between federal and provincial powers
and interests. 49
I permit myself to be definite in this criticism, since the issue
involved is not trivial; on the contrary, it concerns the very
origins of our form of State. It is obvious that the provinces
are not enabled to contract with other countries over things
about which they cannot contract among themselves. Former
article 108 of the National Constitution (article 126 since the
1994 Reform), conclusively limits the provinces power to contract:
47. ANTONIo MARiA HERNANDEZ, INTEGRAcION Y GLOBALIZACI6N
REGIONES, PROVINCIAS Y MUNICIPIOS (Editorial Depalma 2000).
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The provinces ... cannot make treaties of a political character.50
This norm is adopted, and adapted, from the text of article I,
§10 of the Constitution of the United States of America, according
to which: "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Con"51
federation ....

As is obvious, the barrier established by the United States Constitution is stronger than that of Argentina. In synthesis, from
the theory and practice of Argentina and the United States (although there is a long road between what is said and what is
done), one may infer that:
1)The Argentine Constitution expressly permits the Provinces
to enter into treaties "of partial reach" 52 for purposes of the administration of justice, economic interests, and works of common
usefulness, "with notice to the Congress of the Nation. .." just as
it expressly provides that "they cannot enter into treaties of a poThe reasons for these norms go back to the
litical nature."5 3
past
between unitarians and federalists, which
of
the
struggles
fan the memories and fears of the so-called "leagues of governors,"
which have made attempts against institutional unity.
2)In the United States, the consent of Congress is required for
interstate compacts, although there is no fixed formula concerning
the timing and mode of soliciting such approval. The consent may
be given before or after the compact; it may be express, implicit, or
tacit. 54 Neither is there any established formality for approval by
the Congress. It can be done by means of an express statute, by a
joint resolution, by ratification of a state Constitution which contains such a compact, or by means of a compact between the Congress and the interested states.5 5 The Congress can even give
carte blanche approval to certain future compacts within certain
56
specified limits.
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51. See Jorge Reinaldo Vanossi, La Influencia de la Constituci6n de los E.U. de
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52. CONST. ARG. art. 125 (formerly art. 107).
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54. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
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VII.
Finally, there remains in view the possibility offered by the former article 10757 of the National Constitution. The norm is as old
as the Constitution and has antecedents in the United States Constitution and in the Swiss federal model of 1848, in both of which
Alberdi found sources.
According to the tenor of article 107, "the provinces may enter
into partialtreaties for purposes of administration of justice, economic interests, and works of common usefulness, with notice to
the federal Congress . . . ." This is the norm generally cited by the
authors in studying this material. Its context offers an ample
range of possibilities for understandings among the provinces.
Their realization remains within the free volition of the provinces
with only those limitations which arise from the norm itself, that
is, that they be partial agreements which do not deal with an objective of a political character, 58 and that they be made known to
the Congress of the Nation.
Such agreements may be entered into by two or more provinces
and, indeed, by all of the provinces. This can be the most appropriate road to achieving the unification of certain institutions
whose regulation has remained in the hands of the provinces, with
the present-day result of an anachronistic diversification, when
not indeed an obstacle to national action.

Notwithstanding the ample breadth of the words of the norm, it
cannot be understood without considering it in light of its sources.
In addition to the norm set forth in former article 107, it is good to
remember that in the Reports and Background (Dictdmenesy Antecedents) of the Advisory Commission for Institutional Reform of
the year 1971, 59 already referred to, we had proposed:
VIII. Federative structure of the State.
It is proposed that consideration be given to the establishment, by agreement of the provinces concerned, with the approval of the Congress, and without prejudice to the powers
and policies of the Federal government, of regional organs
57.

CONST. ARG. art. 125 according to the 1994 reform.

58.
59.

See CONST. ARG. art. 108, 126.
Comisi6n Asesora para la Reforma Institucional (1971).
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with authority to engage in regional planning and development, through the legitimate implementation of article 107.
Basic proposition: Without damaging the indestructible historical basis of our federalism, or impairing the character of
the provinces as the foundational units of the Argentine
State, we will bestow on ourselves the advantage of regional
groupings for the fixed purposes of planning and the operation of development agencies. Such integration is here proposed in order to resolve at a level intermediate between the
federal State and the provinces those problems common to the
various zones in our country which have distinctive characteristics.
The common participation of the interested provinces themselves and the federal State (through the Congress) assures,
in the formation of the regions and their supra-provincial organs, an equilibrium which is indispensable to the structure
60
of the federal regime.
As is clear, the "regionalist" idea is not new and has been put
forward periodically in our country. These antecedents are valuable as guides to the better interpretation of that which recently
has been inserted into the text of our Supreme Law. It may serve
to inspire and orient those called on by destiny to give effect to
this our hope for a functional organization of governmental bodies
of a non-political character. The recent experiment between the
provinces of C6rdoba and Santa Fe is the embryo of a framework
which may come to be more widespread and about which it is
premature to make a judgment as to its wisdom and efficiency.
We must await concrete results in order to find out if that is the
most advantageous way to achieve the objectives which are part of
the eternal ambition of modernizing the State ....
Ix
I have, in my normative framework surrounding the Supreme
Law, alternative outlines which constitute appropriate ways to
attempt a reasonable regionalization, and which are part of a political-institutional process of three successive stages. From interprovincial treaties to the mechanism foreseen since the dawn-

60.

Id. at 47.
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ing of national organization and set forth in article 13, everything
indicates that it is practicable to depart from the status quo and
begin the journey down the long road to a new "rationalization of
power" (Nirkine Svetzevich), in this case directed to the vertical or
territorial division of the Argentine Federal State.
We must take care not to provoke greater bureaucratization;
rather, on the contrary, we must seek to lighten the apparatus of
intermediation, without overburdening the already heavy and onerous structures of "partition," always being aware that the objective is to achieve a greater and better functionality. In any case, it
should be kept in mind that "Jo inderizzd' [that is, the direction or
orientation] traced by article 124 of the Constitution (as reformed
in 1994) is a directive clause of the Supreme Law, conditioned by
the limits enunciated by articles 125 and 12661 on which we have
commented hereinabove.
To take out of context the norm of article 124 would be like
opening Pandora's box and awaiting resignedly for the fulfillment
of incalculable surprises: A "Trojan horse" stuck into the delicate
machinery of our constitutional system, whose original authors
were conscious of its mixed and atypical character, not able to be
confounded by either the extreme of unitarianism or the "transvestism" of a confederation (a misused term which survives-in
name only-in article 35 of the National Constitution).
At the present time one can find many unitary states that are
more decentralized (e.g., Spain and Italy) than are some others
that are called federal, in much the same way as we see constitutional monarchies that have a more democratic life than some little "banana republics." This points out to us and teaches us that
in matters of forms of government and forms of State we must rid
ourselves of myths and slogans.
Just as Alberdi's formula was that of constructing a "mixed"
form, we must now apply the same mental criterion and the same
methodology of constitutional engineering to look for a way out of
this grave problem of the imbalance of power in what is called,
euphemistically and ironically, the Argentine Federal State. Alberdi was asked: "What kind of State do we need?" Our response
must be the same as his: that which allows us to overcome the
crisis that paralyzes us, and to do so in spite of a state of affairs
that disguises itself in the cloak of permanence.
61.
text.
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What is the ultimate goal, beyond the immediate objective? It is
to bring about a State which can bestow on our Society a higher
quality of life. For this we try to work. The apparatus of state is a
means and not an end in itself; and so the form of the State, just
as the structure of a Government, must adjust and readjust itself-as often as necessary-in order to serve the "general welfare," which is set as the objective by our constitutional Preamble,
full of humanism and universality.
It is not necessary to copy foreign models for the sake of copying. In the search for paradigms, it would be enough to make a
serious act of contrition; and then, on the basis of that clarification, assimilate the national experience, which is very rich in
teachings. Comparative law could help us, but in a subsidiary
way. Let us not forget that comparative law is more a working
tool than an objective in itself. We may utilize it, but with the
care used by the experimental sciences in their laboratory practices.
X.
On the horizon of our anxious waiting, the view provokes in us a
question: Does Argentina, as a "Nation-State," have a viable future? Any reordering attempted internally must take into account
conditions beyond our frontiers. The Argentine Republic is the
only Federal State in the Southern Cone. Chile and Uruguay are
unitary States; and they form part-with us-of a sub-region
which can be called, correctly, "Euro-America." The reasons for
this are obvious and need not be detailed here. We know how to
preserve and fertilize these affinities.
So-called "integration" is not achieved by labels alone. Sailors
say that "the flag covers the goods." This is not so here. Let no
one be confused by the signs, as seductive as they may be: a freetrade association is one thing, a customs union is something else.
Much more complex still is achieving the goal of an embryonic
"common market," however good the inspirations and noble the
intentions.
We need associative relations and we need partners for great
enterprises. Yes, by agreement, but understandings for such ends
must rest on fundamental pillars:
1)There is no society without afectio societatis [i.e., mutual confidence] among its component parts.
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2)He who wishes to enjoy the commodum [i.e., the advantage]
must accept the risk of the trial (just as ancient Roman law
warns).
An interested party cannot be permitted to demand a share of
the benefits and not carry with solidarity the burden of the sacrifices. One comes with the other; otherwise there is no common
interest and the society is a fiction. Either we understand this, or
we will be destroying ourselves. For now, the only real and effective institution that saves us is the telephone, which enables the
heads of state to communicate whenever a crisis arises. But we
must ask ourselves: What will happen if this precarious institution should be insufficient to avoid that which, brilliantly, Ortega
y Gassett called "the suddenness of change"? I do not believe in
fantasies. I do not have faith in the supposed philanthropy of the
internationalists, who are all Eurocentrists, although they need to
hide this from others so as to project an image of universality.
CONCLUSION
I believe that the emotions and the passions conspire against a
rational debate about this topic. Arguments are inhibited and
reason yields to sentiment. If those emotions, summed-up in the
respectable sediment of nostalgia for past glories, do not prevent
us from opting for schemes such as those which I have noted
herein, then the key to resolving the problem is within reach: the
visionary clauses contemplated in the historic Constitution of
1853-186062 offer it.
But let us remember that the future places demands on us, and
that the past does not condemn us. The classic and orthodox conception of a chemically pure federalism is today for us very costly,
inadequate, and insufficient to satisfy the needs of the present and
the expectations for the future.
When one applies federalism to countries that are highly unbalanced in their geo-economic and social reality, the stereotypical
formulas lead to a repetition of old failures. Formulas of federalism lack forward movement if they do not measure out to a minimum of equality of opportunities, 63 replacing unequal development
with harmonicgrowth.
This very day, the much-mentioned "right of access" is a cruel
fiction. Will we persist in living amidst such fantasies? It would
62.

See CONST. ARG. art. 4, 13, 67, 107, 108 and related norms.

63.

See CONST. ARG. art. 75, incision 2, 19 2d.
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seem that the feverish mind has no limits. There is a superabundance of analyses and diagnoses, but we do not see on the horizon
statesmen with transforming force-such as those "profiles in
courage" portrayed by the President of the United States, mysteriously assassinated. With all the reservations that it merits, it
would be good if constitutional freight appropriate to equilibrium
and equality of opportunity required for the healthy function of a
minimum of federalism were applied really and effectively (and
not just rhetorically).
Art. 75. Congress shall have power to:
2. Impose indirect taxes as a power concurrent with that of the
provinces; to impose direct taxes, for a specified time, proportionately equal in all territory of the Nation, provided that defense, common security, and general good of the State demand
it. The taxes described in this section, with the exception of
those which have a specific destination, may be shared [with
the provinces].
A treaty-law, based on agreements between the Nation and the
provinces, shall institute regimes of coparticipationin these [tax
revenues], guaranteeing automatically the remission of the funds.
The distribution among the Nation, the provinces, and the City
of Buenos Aires . . . shall be carried out in direct relation to the
powers, services, and functions of each of them, keeping in mind
objective criteria for sharing; it will be equitable, equal in participation, and shall give priority to the achievement of an equivalent
level of development, quality of life and equality of opportunitiesin
all of the national territory.
The treaty-law shall originate in the Senate and shall be approved by an absolute majority of members of each House, shall
not be modified or regulated unilaterally, and shall be approved by
the provinces.
There shall be no transferal of powers, services, or functions
without a corresponding reallocation of resources, approved by law
of Congress when appropriate and by the interested province or
the City of Buenos Aires, as the case may be.
A federal fiscal organ shall have charge of the control and implementation of the provisions of this section, in such manner as
shall be determined by law, which [law] shall ensure the represen-
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tation of all of the provinces and the City of Buenos Aires in its
composition. 63
As I have announced a "conclusion," I offer in support of it a
gem of (once again) Rodolfo Rivarola, which seems to have been
written for 100 years after its writing, so clear and visionary is it:
The desire to explain existing conditions in terms of their immediate or remote roots, is not sufficient to justify the present and
future usefulness of the federative regime. We men who today
suffer through Argentine life under institutions dictated in 1853
and 1860, find ourselves subjected to the conscience, the passions,
and the will of men who have already passed on. The dead are
governing us through the letter of the Constitution, through words
which were interesting and useful to them. Critical thought demands the examination of the value which those words still have,
and for this critical inquiry the explanation of what happened [in
the past] is not sufficient; rather it is necessary to see what is
happening today, what is possible in the immediate future that
reaches out to touch us, more than in the interests for our children
and later descendants, who shall be given the laws that are useful
64
to them, in our own sentiments and in our own interests.
In our book, El Estado de derecho,65 we maintained that the federal system of division of power is not a sine qua non for assuring
liberty as a value consubstantial with the principle of the lofty
dignity of the human person. The most powerful tool in this effort
is the limitation of power, safeguarded effectively by means of contract and through mechanisms of responsibility. The distribution
of power through the allocation of specific competencies is an adequate technique which can be implemented in many and varied
forms. There is no single way of effectively distributing governmental powers.
And, in the manner of a an epitaph, let us recall one more time
that decentralizationis a genus, and that federalism is but one
species of many that we may choose from an ample menu of options for the organization of the State. May we know how to hit
the mark in the search for the most plausible alternative!

63.
64.
65.

CONST. ARG. art. 75.
RIVAROLO, supra note 4 at 225.
JORGE REINALDO VANOSSI, EL ESTADO DE DERECHO (Ed. Eudeba 2d ed. 1985).
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Federalism?Regionalization?Or What?

I believe that the country urgently needs a federal State with
units in a situation of equivalence, because, at the present time,
federalism is a fiction. I believe that the road to regionalization
did not require reform of the Constitution of 1853 because that
document perfectly well permitted regionalization by means of
interprovincial treaties or other norms such as those of article 13,
which even permit the fusion of provinces among themselves. To
be brief I refer to the judgment of Dorrego, who was not a unitarian but rather a champion of federalism, who opposed the unitarianism of 1826 and said so emphatically in the debates of that
year: Misiones-he said-should join with Corrientes, the Chaco
with Formosa, Tucumdn with Santiago del Estero, Salta with Jujuy, La Rioja with Catamarca; in other words, one must establish
units that are equivalent to one another, because it makes no
sense to have repeated twenty-four times "more of the same," at
the cost which this signifies and the poor quality of life that it offers.
It is necessary to call attention to the need for replacement of
the traditional law of equilibrium, which has reigned, or pretended to reign, in Federal States, by the more realistic law of
"equivalence." The old law of "equilibrium" refers to the permanent tension which is felt in Federal States between the centripetal forces, which fight for the growth of central power, and the
forces of the local units, which do the opposite.
The study of [Argentina's] past reveals constant or recurring
temptations either to return to a Confederation or to move to a
unitary consolidation. In either event, the federal state would
disappear. The fear of dissolution, which comes with the separation of the Provinces was, in the terminology of Fromm, the
equivalent of tanatos, that is, death, while the centralist movement, which points toward a State without autonomous units, was
like "eros": all-embracing and forged like iron. In the midst of
such tensions and temptations, there remained the hybrid, which
few envisioned as a permanent status, and most believed to be
intrinsically fugacious.
II.
This theme is always seized [as by an illness] with certain gnostic-logical difficulties, whether because of its cryptic or confused
character, or because of its mysterious and arcane aspect-
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seeming in the eyes of the people to be a square circle-an apparent contradiction. In reality, the issue forms part of the "perpetual" crisis of States, which, as the great Spanish master Adolfo
Posada has said, ever since the State has existed it has been
known to be in such a situation of crisis, always existing in a condition of permanent transformation and, like each situation of
change, producing a considerable dose of anxiety in its protagonists and its citizens.
The federal equilibrium has always offered an image of crisis for
the simple reason that the statal and social reality which it attempts to represent is eminently "dynamic": the State is the least
static entity that one can imagine. Because of this, it is useless to
attempt a logical analysis. Sometimes it has been the fruit or response to a predominantly "illogical" manifestation. Nowadays
what the authors George Burdeau and Maurice Duverger call "Social Federalism" seems to be imposed, responding to a interplay of
the natural order of society and the autonomy of the will, that is to
say, the road to novel forms of social contract.
That which some authors present as the paradigm of the "vertical" or territorial division of power, other thinkers reduce to one
more variety of what in itself is a very rich gamut of possible
forms of state "decentralization." It is often said that decentralization is the "genus" while federalism is the "species." Already
many decades ago, that great jurist of the Twentieth Century,
Hans Kelsen, warned that all of these forms are part, or points of
location, of an "iter" [road] which runs from maximum concentration (whose extreme leads to State absolutism) to the maximum
decentralization (whose extreme leads to the disintegration or dissolution of the State). In the middle, between one extreme and the
other, one can focus on diverse "species" of organization, whether
for the creation or the application of law, and of the political decisions which revise juridical forms by means of norms. Let us not
forget that according to the famous author just cited, the State
and the law identify with one another and the State is nothing
other than the metaphorical personification of the whole juridical
order. From there it is deduced that the law regulates its own
creation and does so with a variety of modalities.
That "species that is federalism," follows in history from a multiplicity of causes, since as is pointed out by the Cordoban philosopher Orgaz, "in history there are no single causes." The following
are a few examples:
1. Thirteen [English North American] colonies without structural ties among them;
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2. City-towns within the same [Spanish colonial] viceroyalty;
3. Confederations of [Swiss] cantons of diverse origins;
4. Nations of continental dimensions, where federalism was created to ensure governability;
5. Quasi-artificial creations that are a consequence of peace treaties;
6.Ideological impositions to disguise hegemonic goals (e.g. the
former U.S.S.R.);
7. Domination by one nationality over another or others;
The great question that always remains in each such situation
was how to maintain or recapture "equilibrium." In every class of
"transaction" recorded in the annals of the history of federal experiences, from territorial compensations to forced migrations,
financial "assistance" or fiscal sharing almost always has been an
important part of the picture.

Federalism has caused the shedding of as much ink as blood:
the ink of the intellectual and the blood of the innocent. Was it
worth it? Let us not make the calculation of the financialeconomic costs or try to establish by equation the famous costbenefit analysis. Federalism is expensive. I prefer unitarism,
with certain forms of decentralization, themselves limited by considerations of "effectiveness." Decentralization is good only insofar as it ensures reasonable levels of efficiency. Beyond that, it
does not serve us.
But this is not a case of crying over spilt milk. Today, the key to
the vault leads us to another perilous undertaking. The current
problem is one of ascertaining and attaining "equivalency" of the
units or component parts of the federation. From the known phenomena and the results of various experiments, conclusive data
can be inferred which provides a basis for evaluation and selection
in achieving the long-sought goal of unity in diversity.
This goal of centralization is not attainable when the component
units (that is to say, the local, federated units) are so dissimilar
one from another that there is no equivalency, either qualitatively
or quantitatively. A fundamental datum in this evaluation is the
percentage of the resources of the local units that are provided to
them by the central government. The question is: At what point
is the enjoyment of local autonomy dependent upon the National
Treasury? Where does real activity end and the fiction or farce
begin?
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CONCLUSION

a)The answer is not to be found by following the way of sentimentality or passion, but rather by the road of reason; that is, by
finding a wise connection between means and ends. What is
needed is neither hypernormativism nor hyperfactualism, but constitutional realism.
b)In the matter of the territorial distribution of governmental
power, there are no worthwhile rules to be imported or exported.
c) Equivalency should begin by the grouping of the weakest
units, not the strongest.
d)Those countries of Latin America that have adopted, in their
constitutions, the federal form of state (Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela,
and Argentina), in reality have types of quasi-federalism, semifederalism, and pseudo-federalism-usually with a net imbalance
in favor of centralism. One finds (local) autonomy without (local)
self-government, and vice versa. It amounts to a paradox: legislating without electing, or electing without legislating or adjudicating.
e) The old "law of equilibrium" has been superseded. In its place
should be the "law of equivalencies." Whether implemented by the
fusion of preexisting local units, or through agreements of regionalization and integration, these processes tend to configure a
country whose component parts do not suffer the asymmetries
that become insurmountable at a time when relations of equality
should govern the interplay of governmental institutions.

